Google's Android - Trouble in Paradise
There has been much discussion of late regarding a possible downside to the Google Android operating system for mobile devices. The concerns are that the planned open applications environment will either fragment into a balkanized collection of insignificant entities or that the carriers will each develop their own unique implementations of Android and use them to promote for their own networks. In either case, the result would be that Android does not deliver the type of open mobile environment Google had promised with the Open Handset Alliance.
Before we go to far on the “problem” side, we should note that Android-based devices are selling like hotcakes, and Android users are thrilled with the experience. According to NPD Group, Android sales leapt past iPhone in the first quarter of this year. While the initial response is overwhelmingly positive, Google is blazing a new path in the mobile device space. They are promoting an open operating system that can be supported on a variety of devices (e.g. smartphones, tablets, or “other”), manufactured by a number of vendors (e.g. Motorola, HTC, Samsung), and operating on virtually any mobile network (e.g. 3G, LTE, WiMAX, Wi-Fi).
While this is certainly an exciting prospect, no one in the mobile device space has been successful with that model as yet. Developing applications for mobile devices is not the same thing as developing for desktops and laptops, as the operating system is often closely coupled to the hardware. The result has been that the only really effective business models have been those that constrained the options. The two most notable examples of that are Apple and RIM who control the device, the operating system and the applications distribution.
The closest thing we have had to an open mobile operating system was Windows Mobile. That venture has failed to gain traction for a number of reasons, the most obvious of which is that they lost sight of the basic requirements of mobile users and wound up with a “camel design” - for those who didn’t grow up with engineer humor, a “camel” is defined as “a horse designed by a committee.”
The result was that the most powerful Windows Mobile applications, like the capability to hand off calls between Wi-Fi and cellular networks, could only be supported on a very limited range of devices. In some cases, mobile computer manufacturers like Motorola/Symbol Technologies who depended on Windows Mobile would guarantee that their software would work but only on their own devices. Microsoft has already announced that they will take a different path with the planned Windows Phone 7 and will pursue a strategy more akin to RIM and Apple.
So if history is any guide, the concerns regarding Google’s ability to couple openness and universal applications support in Android do have some foundation. Articles describing the fragmentation problem (or arguing that there was no problem) began to appear as early as March. Bill Snyder went after the Dell Aero in the Industry Standard most recently pointing out that the Aero runs on Android 1.5 that is 16 months old and four versions behind the current Android 2.2 OS.
Jason Hiner of Tech Republic took another tack in a piece titled "The dirty little secret about Google Android." His premise is that Google is backsliding on its commitment to openness and that the Android operating system is being co-opted by the mobile operators who will deliver Android devices encumbered with the operators’ own “bloatware”. He also holds up the iPhone as the model, but in my view Apple has merely substituted their own obsessive control model for that of the carriers.
In truth, the only way to put the mobile device business on a new path is by taking the mobile operators out of the hardware business and forcing them to compete on their services alone. Even if the customer can buy their own handset, the carrier is still fundamentally in control. The consumer’s decision to buy their own handset will be predicated on how big a discount the carrier going to give them on the service plan.
As the mobile market continues to develop, there are two ways this type of transition could potentially come about. First, users could universally migrate to pre-paid services, get rid of “cellular plans” all together, buy the handset they want, and go shop for a provider who could support it. The other possible outcome is that the regulators step in and force a separation between the service and the device. Several years ago my pal Dave Passmore of the Burton Group (now Gartner) wrote a piece in Business Communications Review calling for a Carterfone for wireless.
While Android may be going through some growing pains, Google is still the consumer’s biggest ally in altering the status quo in the mobile business, and altruism has little to do with that. Google’s entire business model is predicated on the assumption of free and open access to information regardless of the device you use, and they intend to profit handsomely by serving as the premier portal to that information.
Conclusion
I have long held that the mobile operators’ business model is the greatest impediment to the development of the mobile device market. The carriers’ self-serving business interests are standing on the throat of the device market, and adding little in the way of value to the consumer. They do provide “financing” by packaging the handset with the service plan, but they don’t provide “value”. There may be technical challenges in moving to open mobile device platforms, but our industry knows how to address those. The bigger challenge will be in altering the business model. The Android discussion illustrates that there is growing pressure on the mobile operators on a number of fronts, but you can be sure that the operators will not going down without a fight.